Crisis Demography in Eurasia

In a recent post, Mark Adomanis pointed out that the Russian economy has done significantly better than many other East European nations during the recent crisis and is now mounting a strong recovery. He also speculated on the effects of the crisis on the demography of badly-affected countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltics, on the basis that “Russia’s experience during the 1998 debt default amply demonstrates that cutting healthcare budgets and pensions in the midst of an economic catastrophe causes a lot of excess deaths among vulnerable sectors of the population”.

Now I’ve never really worried about the consequences on mortality of an economic recession, because I don’t buy into The Lancet‘s arguments that it was the reduction in Russian social spending in 1998 that contributed to the mortality wave of 1999-2002, since the increasing affordability of, and consumption of, alcohol was by far the more convincing factor. (Also, in industrialized states, recessions tend to correlate with falls in mortality rates). On the other hand, hard recessions – especially ones which result in reduced public spending on social welfare – usually are associated with substantial reductions in fertility. In this post I’m going to take a look at how valid these observations and theories are in light of the recent economic crisis in Eastern Europe.

Russia. At the start of the crisis in late 2008, I expected Russia’s fertility rate to fall slightly – though nowhere near the magnitudes predicted by Russia’s “demographic doomers”, of course. (Though even for that I got a lot of flak). Yet ironically even my predictions turned out to be too pessimistic, probably because increased government spending meant that Russians’ social welfare hardly suffered at all during the crisis. Even Russia’s fertility rate continued to climb, reaching 1.56 in 2009 (2008 – 1.49, 2007 – 1.41, 2006 – 1.30), a level last seen in 1992. And like I said, Russia’s trends towards falling mortality actually accelerated, with life expectancy for both genders hitting 69.0 years in 2009 (2008 – 67.9, 2007 – 67.5, 2006 – 66.6, 2005 – 65.3) – a level that was only ever previously observed in 1963-1974 and 1986-1991. Most encouragingly, Russians’ mortality from “vices” – homicide, alcohol poisoning, and suicide – have fallen back to their late Soviet levels. The decline in alcohol poisonings is particularly good because much of Russia’s “hyper-mortality” (including the high rate of heart disease) is tied to excessive alcohol consumption.

[Source: Rosstat].

Demographic improvements relative to the same period last year continued in Q1 2010, with the birth rate up another 1.3% and mortality rates falling by 2.0% (inc. by about 10% for external causes). (The figures on fertility are particularly significant when you recall that Russia reached the nadir of its economic crisis in H1 2009). According to Sergey Slobodyan’s demographic model, the data indicates that a projection of 1.9-2.0mn deaths and 1.8-1.9mn births in 2010 is feasible, meaning that natural population decrease will almost cease (the total population should grow, as last year, due to immigrants).

Conclusion – contrary to hysterical predictions of economic and demographic apocalypse propagated about Russia in late 2008, the real impact on social welfare was very marginal and the demographic situation actually continued to improve. This year, Russia’s life expectancy will probably approach 70 years (still very low for an industrialized country) and its total fertility rate will hit around 1.6 children per woman (as in Canada). Although the mortality rate remains very substandard relative to the industrialized world, current healthcare and anti-alcohol initiatives are helping usher in rapid improvements.

PS. There has been a small update to Rosstat‘s demographic projections. Its middle projection now indicates a population of 140.9mn and its high projection a population of 146.7mn in 2025, relative to 141.9mn in 2009; in the last few years, Russia’s demography has tracked between the High and Medium projections. (This is in line with my own forecasts).

Ukraine. Mark Adomanis claims that Ukraine has a “much more serious demographic crisis than Russia”. But much as one can condemn Orange mismanagement of the economy and social relations, it can’t really be said in good faith that its demography is a lot worse. Whereas its birth rates are lower and its death rates are higher than Russia’s, this is in large part because Ukraine has a marginally older median age than Russia.

Let’s instead use measures that cancel out the effects of specific population age structure. Ukraine’s life expectancy (68.3) was marginally better than Russia’s (67.8) in 2008 (World Bank), and its big mortality reductions in 2008-09 indicate that it kept the lead. Similarly, Russia’s fertility rate (1.49) is not awesomely bigger than Ukraine’s (1.39) in 2008, and may be partly or wholly explained by the fact that Russia’s demographic collapse in the 1990’s was both quicker and sharper than Ukraine’s. Finally, both countries have been displaying very similar demographic dynamics in recent years, despite their political differences – a moderate recovery in fertility rates (from a low base), and plummeting death rates (from a very high base).

[Source: World Bank Development Indicators. Note that for all the vast differences in the political economy and post-transition success of Russia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine, their fertility (and overall demographic) dynamics are remarkably alike].

Now what about the crisis, which hit Ukraine much harder than Russia? (Ukraine’s GDP declined by 15% in 2009, compared to Russia’s 9%, and it wasn’t cushioned by increased government spending on social welfare). Ukraine’s birth rate increased ever so slightly from 11.0/1000 in 2008 to 11.1/1000 in 2009 (but fell from 11.2/1000 in Jan-Feb 2009 to 10.7/1000 in Jan-Feb 2010). Meanwhile, its death rate decreased from 16.3/1000 in 2008 to 15.2/1000 in 2009 (and from 17.2/1000 in Jan-Feb 2009 to 16.4/1000 in Jan-Feb 2010). In crude terms, Ukraine had a higher rate of natural population decrease than Russia (-4.2/1000 versus -1.7/1000 in 2009), and its overall population is still falling fast because unlike Russia it does not have many immigrants.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian crisis is now easing and the new government seems to be moving from concentrating on historical grievances to modernization and stability. Given the inherent similarities between and increasing integration of Russia and Ukraine, their demographic dynamics will probably be likewise similar – a recovery of fertility rates to 1.7-1.8 within a few years, a rise in life expectancy to 75 years within a decade, substantial net migration to Russia and zero net migration to Ukraine. The result would be a slowly rising or stagnating population in Russia, and a stagnating or slowly falling population in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Ukraine is experiencing a demographic recovery, with particularly impressive gains in life expectancy during the crisis. Though its fertility rate remained more or less stagnant, it now again shows signs of improvement – a good sign, since nine months ago Ukraine was still at its economic nadir.

Belarus. Thanks to its isolation from the global financial system, Belarus did not experience much of an economic crisis at all. It’s GDP even grew by 1.5% in 2009, and has since expanded by 6.1% in Jan-Apr 2010 relative to the same period last year. But ironically, its demographic improvements have been modest.

The birth rate rose from 11.1/1000 to 11.6/1000 and the death rate rose from 13.8/1000 to 14.2/1000 from 2008 to 2009*. (In Q1 2010 relative to the same period last year, the birth rate fell from 11.3/1000 to 11.2/1000 and the death rate fell from 15.3/1000 to 15.1/1000). The rate of natural increase eased slightly to -2.5/1000 in 2009, from -2.6/1000 in 2008.

This means that Belarus retained a fertility rate of about 1.45-1.5 children per woman in 2009, compared to Russia’s 1.56 and Ukraine’s 1.4-1.45, and its life expectancy was somewhat higher than both at 70.5 years in 2008 (very slightly lower in 2009), compared with Russia’s 69.0 years in 2009 and Ukraine’s 68.3 years in 2008 (maybe a year higher in 2009).

Conclusion – despite emerging from the crisis largely unscathed, the demography of Belarus showed no significant improvement (or deterioration).

Latvia. Latvia saw a catastrophic decline of GDP of 18% in 2010 and its welfare state has been decimated to a degree unparalleled anywhere else in Europe (at least so far). From 2008 to 2009, births fell by 9.5% and marriages, a very rough indicator of future fertility, fell by a truly stunning 23.3%. The decline continued into 2010, with births in Jan-Mar falling by 11.6% and marriages declining by 22.4% on the same period in 2009. Since Latvia’s total fertility rate was a not too healthy 1.45 back in 2008, this means that it is now in one of the deepest demographic chasms in Europe.

[Source: Latvijas Statistika].

On the positive side, Latvia did see modest improvements in its mortality rates, which fell by 3.6% from 2008 to 2009 (though they’ve remained almost stagnant so far in 2010). Unsurprisingly, after a period of demographic recovery in the 2000’s, Latvia’s rate of natural population decrease has started opening up again, rising from a loss of 7058 people in 2008 to 8220 people in 2009, and almost certain to increase further this year.

Small consolation. Going by the experiences of other countries in the region, the falling marriage rate in Latvia should have been accompanied by a simultaneously falling divorce rate, so the post-2008 annual decline in net couple formation should have been less than 20%.

Estonia. Estonia’s had a milder recession than Latvia with a GDP fall of 14% (it’s all comparative!) and it did not decimate its welfare state to quite the same extent. It also started from a position of significantly greater affluence and its fertility rate was at 1.66 children per woman in 2008. The number of births fell by 2.6% from 2008 to 2009, and by a mere 0.9% in the first four months of 2010 relative to the same period last year. This decline was outpaced by improvements in longevity, with mortality rates falling by 3.7% in 2009 relative to 2008, and a further 3.5% in the first four months of 2010 relative to the same period in 2009. Since it now shows signs of mounting an early recovery, the crisis should not make a big dent in Estonia’s long-term demographic prospects.

Lithuania. Their situation seems to have become somewhat worse, based on the monthly estimates of the population size for 2009. But their national statistics site is bad and doesn’t have detailed recent data so I can’t really say much more than that it is worse than in Estonia but far better than in Latvia.

Conclusion – the crisis has been a demographic disaster for Latvia, with its total fertility probably falling to a “lowest-low” rate of around 1.2 children per woman by 2010. Since its economic crisis seems to be deep and long-lasting, with deleterious effects on social welfare, we can expect a resumption of demographic free fall and perhaps a rise in ethnic Russian emigration to (fast recovering) Russia. In contrast, Estonia’s stronger foundations weathered the crisis well and its total fertility rate, now at perhaps 1.6 children per woman, is still relatively healthy by East and Central European standards.

Caucasus. In Armenia, the crude death rate remained unchanged at 8.5/1000 from 2008 and 2009, while the birth rate rose from 12.7/1000 to 13.7/1000, despite its big decline in GDP during the crisis. Given that its total fertility rate was at 1.74 in 2008, it is doing fine. Georgia is probably doing OK, since their population actually rose in 2009 – the only other post-Soviet year in which Georgia experienced population growth was in 2006, which happened to coincide with Russia’s deportation of illegal Georgian immigrants.

Moldova. Doesn’t have vital stats for 2009. Its overall population fell by five thousand people in 2009 relative to 2008, which is lower than usual, since on most years it falls by around ten thousand. I don’t think this was due to demographic improvements – don’t forget that many Moldovans were returning from their work in Russia during its recession in 2009.

Rest of post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan and Central Asia don’t need to be considered since they have healthy demographics anyway.

The Balkans. Birth rates and death rates seemed to have remained essentially stable from 2008 to 2009 in Bulgaria and Romania, with a slight improvement overall. Crisis hasn’t affected them much – at least, not yet.

Final conclusion – overall, the crisis did not greatly affect the demography of the Eurasian region. There continued to be modest improvements in the two most populous nations, Russia and Ukraine. The death rate has fallen rapidly during the crisis almost everywhere, the sole exceptions being Belarus and Romania where it increased by a tiny amount. On the other hand, birth rates have either risen slowly (e.g. Russia), stagnated (e.g. Ukraine), or fallen slowly (e.g. Estonia). The major exception is Latvia, where birth rates have collapsed at an amazing rate from regional average to “lowest-low”. This reflects the particular severity of the economic crash in Latvia.

* The real rise in the birth rate and the death rate from 2008 to 2009 are actually slightly exaggerated. That is because from 2009, Belarus lowered its total population (on the basis of which birth and death rates / 1000 people are calculated) to correlate with the preliminary results of the 2009 Census. The actual number of births rose from 107.9 thousand to 109.8 thousand and the number of deaths rose from 133.9 thousand to 135.0 thousand.


  1. Doug M. says:

    Armenia is a tricky case, because of its immense diaspora. Or rather, diasporas. There are the long-term immigrants and their children and grandchildren — now Armenian-Americans, Armenian-French and so forth. These are unlikely to provide significant immigration back to Armenia, but there is a significant trickle — there are probably several thousand of them living in Yerevan — and they do provide an immense national safety net both in peace and war.

    The other diaspora is of short-term workers, and there are several hundred thousand of these. They slosh back and forth between Armenia, Europe and the CIS. There are Armenian accountants, mechanics, engineers and bankers all over Moscow, and large communities in Kiev and Paris as well. This group is in some way similar to the Moldovans or Central Asians, but they tend to be better educated.

    Armenia’s demographic prospects over the next 20 years depend not so much on TFRs (though those are certainly important) as on the slosh rate of all those immigrants. If most of them stay in Moscow (or wherever), Armenia’s population is going to shrink dramatically. If most of them rebound back home, it will stay roughly stable.

    The question is more pressing for Armenia than for most parts of the fUSSR, because Armenia is locked in a military contest with Azerbaijan. The current population ratio is 8.9 million Azeris to about 3.3. million Armenians. However, by 2020 those numbers will be more like 9.8 million to 3.2 million. In other words, in just a decade it could shift from 2.7 / 1 to 3.1 / 1. And if you look at men of military age, it gets even worse; by 2020 Azerbaijan’s pool of men 18-35 should be easily four times the size of Armenia’s. Combine this with Azerbaijan’s ever-growing oil wealth and it’s a very uncomfortable situation for the Armenians.

    This goes a long way to explain, BTW, the current Armenian government”s attempt to find a rapprochement with Turkey. This was a brilliant stroke on their part; if successful it would have transformed the regional strategic situation to Armenia’s advantage. Unfortunately, it looks like domestic politics have stymied it.

    Doug M.

    • I think the military balance has already titled decisively against Armenia relative to Azerbaijan, and without its oil wealth there is really nothing Armenia can do about it. It’s only choice now is to throw in its lot with Russia and the CSTO, as it has been doing.

      I don’t know the details, but I was more under the impression that the failure of the Armenia-Turkey talks was due to 1) Turkey’s worry about distancing itself from Azerbaijan a key node in any Nabucco pipeline project 2) which were reinforced by Russia’s wooing of Azerbaijan e.g. by offering 30% higher prices for transiting its gas through Russia instead of Turkey. Quite simply, IMO, Armenia is firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence and Turkey reconciling with it offers Turkey no advantages and only geopolitical penalties.

      • Doug M. says:


        1) I would disagree that the military balance has tilted “decisively” against Armenia — yet. They do have advantages, including excellent mountainous defensive positions, more developed human capital, and the vast human and financial resources of their diasporas. You’ll notice Aliyev Junior has not yet tried to roll the dice on a war; there are reasons for that.

        2) Armenia “threw in its lot” with Russia years ago; there have been Russian troops in the country since the late 1990s, and Russian companies own much of Armenia’s infrastructure, including the railroads and the largest mobile provider. The current Sarkisian government has seamlessly continued the policies of its predecessor in this regard.

        That said, Armenia is definitely not counting on Russia to intervene in the event of an Azeri attack. The Armenians believe that a close association with Russia will make an attack less likely, but they don’t think Russia will help fend off the attack if it does come. (N.B., I concur with this assessment.)

        3) The failure of the agreement is complicated. You’ll notice I didn’t say whose domestic politics!

        That said, I think it’s clear the Sarkisian government really wanted it. The Turks, it’s less clear, but I think they would have been content with either its success or its failure /if failure could be plausibly blamed on the Armenians/ — which has turned out to be the case.

        Why would Turkey have been content with success? Because (1) it would have been a diplomatic triumph that would have bolstered Turkey’s prestige in the region; (2) it would have burnished Ankara’s credentials as a rational peacemaker — useful in other regional disputes, and also in relations with the EU; and (3) it would have opened up Armenia to economic relations with Turkey — and once that border is open, geography more or less compels Armenia, in the long run, to become an economic satellite of Turkey.

        If the Armenians had promptly ratified the accord, the Turks would have had no choice but to go through with it — reaping the advantages mentioned above, but suffering a hit in relations with Azerbaijan. But since the Armenians couldn’t bring themselves to do so, the Ozal government could let the domestic opposition go nuts — and then sigh heavily and say, well, at the end of the day it’s really the Armenians’ fault!

        4) Note that routing the pipeline through Russia puts Russia in a very delicate position if war does come. (Armenia’s war strategy includes an early strike against Azerbaijan’s pipelines; the Armenians have been very open about this. )

        5) Finally, you can’t discuss this topic without mentioning Iran. Iran started out pro-Azeri at the beginning of the war, but soon shifted to being neutral; it’s been quite openly pro-Armenian ever since. Very close Armenian-Iranian friendship, just short of actual alliance, has been a significant stabilizer of the conflict. Armenian President Sarkisian was the very first foreign leader to congratulate Iran’s President on his successful re-election last year…

        However, in the last 18 months, Teheran has been trying to mend fences with Baku. So far this has been mostly a charm offensive, but it’s been very unnerving to the Armenians, who rely on the relationship with Iran nearly as much as the one with Russia — Iran is, after all, a lot closer.

        Doug M.

        • I really disagree with your 2). Armenia is in the CSTO, along with Russia, and since the CSTO’s charter obliges its signatories to treat an attack against one member as an attack against all, Russia would be treaty-bound to provide military assistance to Armenia. Besides, letting Azerbaijan win – which I really think they will, for despite your caveats their military budget is now more than 4x larger than Armenia’s – would not only discredit Russian security assurances, it will also severely degrade its position in the Caucasus relative to Turkey. In the worst case scenario (for Russia), Azerbaijan could even take off a chunk of southern Armenia in order to acquire an outright corridor into Turkey…

          All this, btw, is also the reason I believe Aliyev has refrained from “rolling the dice”. He knows they are weighted to a Russian interference that will prove disastrous to Azerbaijan, and sitting on so much oil wealth, it’s not as if he even needs to gamble to have a good life.

          • Doug M. says:

            Alas: CSTO membership, while relevant, is not a show-stopper.

            Why? Because Nagorno-Karabakh is not part of Armenia. The Karabakhtsy say they’re an independent republic; everyone else views them as a breakaway province of Armenia. So, formally, an Azeri attack on Nagorno — or the non-Nagorno buffer zone the Armenians grabbed in ’95 — would not be an attack on *Armenia*.

            Armenia’s CSTO membership does complicate things for Azerbaijan, because it restricts them from attacking Armenia proper. From a military POV, an attack on Nagorno should be accompanied by strikes against (for instance) the one highway leading from Armenia to Nagorno, the single rail line that runs south from Yerecan, and the military camps and supply dumps in southern Armenia just over the Nagorno border. As a practical matter, the Azeris would be in the uncomfortable position of storming excellent mountainous defensive positions along a narrow front, while supplies and reinforcements were allowed to pour in from Armenia without interference. So while it doesn’t make an Azeri attack impossible, it is a significant strategic PITA, doing much to neutralize Azerbaijan’s advantage in manpower and money.

            All three parties are acutely aware of this, BTW. This is why the Armenians are always trying to talk up the CSTO — they basically threw a national party for the joint CSTO maneuvers a year or so back — while the Russians are very careful to limit their statements. But while the Armenian government publicly insists that the CSTO would help them, all their planning is based on the assumption that nobody will actually intervene.

            Chunk of southern Armenia: I’m sorry, but that’s never going to happen. As noted above, that /would/ trigger Russian intervention. It would also piss off both Turkey and Iran. Note alsothat Nakhichevan has formally been under Turkish military protection since the 1990s, so there’d be no strategic justification for such an advance.

            Doug M.

  2. Anatoly,

    Good post, but my mantra is “wait and see.” The most savage of the budget cuts in places like Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine have yet to really sink in: the political leadership in those countries have been doing their level best to skirt the rules of the IMF bailouts but that strategy is sustainable for only a very limited period of time. Let’s check back in 6 months or so and see what the trajectories are for all of these places after pensions have actually been slashed and health budgets have actually been cut. I certainly hope that the trend towards “normalcy” that seems to be taking place continues, but I have my doubts that Romanian pensioners (who aren’t exactly legendary for their luxorious lifestyles) can absorb 15% reductions in income without some pretty serious adverse consequences.

    • I agree – things will be clearer in a year, when I plan to redo this post. I’m not sure Ukraine will end up reducing social welfare spending much. One of the biggest drains on funds has been alleviated (the gas-for-fleet deal) and metallurgical prices are on the up-bound along with other commodities (though that may yet go into reverse if Europe and China falter in a big way).

      I really doubt mortality rates decrease when pensioners become poorer. I don’t want to sound callous, but it’s a fact that for the elderly, eating vegetables and grains is better than the dairy products, eggs and booze that tends to be cut out when times become hard. The main concern, I think, is the effect on fertility rates. As Latvia showed, a severe economic crisis can lead to a drastic increase in birth postponement, but given that the populations of Eastern Europe are already aging rapidly, any postponement may well be permanent now.

  3. Maybe, you should make a same survey about demographics of Russia itself. Fertility and death in different regions (core russia, caucasus, volga republics, siberia and far east), like, greatly differ, you know.

    • There’s not much point in that, I think. The internal differences (leaving aside Buddhist peoples and South Caucasian Muslims) within Russia are fairly small – and can basically be reduced to Russians in the Center & North-West being slightly older, slightly less fertile, and having slightly higher life expectancies than Russians in the South, Volga-Urals, and Siberia.

  4. The United States is going to add 100 million “citizens” by 2030 largely through a failure to adopt a rational immigration policy or control its borders. The country will not be stronger, richer or happier. The fools like Mark Steyn that praise America’s “growth” and mock Europe’s “decline” have absolutely no idea what America is actually growing to be. I defer to AK on Eastern European demographics. But if say Russia shrinks into a smaller Russia and America grows into a big Venezuela who is actually having the demographic crisis?

    • I’ve never said Russia is likely to shrink. My own opinion on the matter is that within the next two decades Russia’s population is either going to stagnate or slightly increase, so that by 2025 it will be in the 140mn-150mn range.

      The important thing is not so much overall population but dependency ratios. Europe’s big problem isn’t that populations are going to start stagnating or falling, it’s that a rapidly falling labor pool may not be able to provide the tax revenues to support their generous welfare states (indeed they are already falling apart in Greece).

  5. Armenia is doing fine enough. Doug’s comments are correct. Armenia also has good relations with Iran…and Iran does not want a “Greater Azerbaijan” project to ever succeed. I don’t mean to be sarcastic…or I do…but the Azeris are just going to lose more territory if they invade Artsakh. “Oil wealth” doesn’t buy military competence. Most Azeris would rather shoot the corrupt Alievs than die for a territory everyone knows is Armenian.Stalin’s border changes didn’t erase centuries of Armenian sovereignty and the Armenians are as determined as the Jews to hang onto to their homeland. They would fight to the last man. They won in absolutely desperate conditions in the 90s and if anything are actually in a stronger position today.

  6. No, you didn’t say Russia was going to “shrink” and I thought my comment was carefully directed at Steyn et al. I have little quarrel with your analysis. I will throw out,however,that California with an expanding and younger population than Greece is terminally insolvent . I don’t believe Greece is terminally insolvent.It is impossible to imagine ten million new “Californians” being “richer,happier or safer”. Write down the collapse of California (before your eyes) as the long term future of the USA if trends continue. A stable or even slightly shrinking productive and educated population is not a long term problem.

  7. A comment on Ukraine – there are huge regional differences in terms of population growth rates, as seen on this map from right before the crisis (2008):

    Western Ukrainian regions (and Crimea, thanks in large part I suspect to the large Crimean Tatar population) show population stability while the eastern regions centered on Donetsk show very steep declines. Even before the crisis, those eastern regions may have reached their “basement.”

    My impression from a recent visit is that the crisis has not affected non-steel-exporting-dependent western Ukraine very much at all – indeed the place appears to be booming and unlike even a few years ago Lviv no longer has a third world vibe but now feels quite a bit like Krakow or the Baltic capitals. Since western Ukraine seems to be driving Ukraine’s decent demographic figures, the lack of a major crisis in the western regions of the country (along with the fact that the eastern regions may have already largely reached their basement and can’t go much lower) may in part explain Ukraine’s demographic stability during the crisis.

    It would be interesting to see demographic data in Ukraine by region for 2009.

  8. Milko Mesones Perez says:

    Do we really still high fertility of Muslims in the Caucasus?, I have read many articles that indicate that the birth of this group is in decline, I’ve also read that the birth rate of ethnic Russians is increasing what really happening?, I read previous articles you have posted and also mentions that the birth rate of Muslims in the Caucasus is in decline, but now I read a response from you where you mention that Buddhists and Muslims of the Caucasus have the highest birth rate, it is perhaps no ethnic Russians are increasing and that all increase the birth rate in Russia is due to Muslims and budistas.por Answer me please thanks

    • The notion that the increase in Russia’s fertility rate is all down to Muslim and Buddhist ethnicities is simply wrong, because Slavic Russians have had some of the biggest rises in fertility rates in recent years. In any case, since the Caucasian Muslims and Buddhists together make up no more than 10% of the Russian population, their effect on all-Russia demographic trends are inevitable going to be marginal.

  9. Hello Anatoly, I just read a story from Russia indicates that the higher birth rate in these first four months was 1.3%, but again had read several news that the increase between January and March had been 1.5 % Compared to anterior.por read what I can understand that the increase in April has now been low since the increase over the previous year is 1.3%, please answer my duda.ah and would be great be monitored quarterly , Monthly or semi-annual births per oblast, region and republic, here put an interesting LINKS Q1 2010 which leads us to see how it evolves births and deaths, I hope you provide the LINKS. Thanks in advance for your answer

  10. Javier tantalean says:

    Dear Anatoly, I too am confused with this information I read in the voice of russia 2 information about the higher birth rate in Russia related to last year.
    1-In the first three months of 2010 the birth rate grew 1.5% over the previous year.
    2-In the first four months of 2010 the birth rate grew 1.3% over last year.

    Did the April data is lower for that low of 1.5 to 1.3%? or is a wrong information from the press, and that all authorities and other news only talk about data from the first three months. I await your prompt response and thanks Anatoly to disseminate accurate data

    • Calm down, please. I don’t spend all my time on this blog and I have no obligation to provide you with prompt responses.

      Correct – Q1 2010 births were 1.5% higher relative to the corresponding period in 2009 and Jan-April 2010 births were 1.3% higher relative to the corresponding period in 2009. Russian statistics state that April 2010 births were 0.6% higher relative to April 2009.

      You can find more info at Rosstat’s demography portal, which you can read with Google Translate.

  11. PS. Latvia update – remains in a very deep rut. In this April, 1570 births – down from 1849 in 2009 and 2038 in 2008. Mortality rates are remaining roughly constant relative to last year.